



Submission for the National Forensic Accounting Teaching and Research Symposium 
2012- (Re)defining the Forensic Accountant, merging practice, research and education 
  | John Chevis and Bernard Barrum 
 
APPLIED FORENSIC ACCOUNTING – EXPERIENCES FROM THE 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNIT 
 
 
Page | 2  
 
The opinions expressed in this  paper are those of the authors and do not represent those 
of the Australian Federal Police, The Papua New Guinea-Australia Policing Partnership 
or the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary.  
Table of Contents 
 
Overview ............................................................................................................................ 3 
About the Authors ............................................................................................................... 3 
PNG – A Brief History and Description ................................................................................ 4 
Politics ............................................................................................................................... 5 
Economy ............................................................................................................................ 5 
Corruption .......................................................................................................................... 6 
Background on the Papua New Guinea Financial Intelligence Unit ......................................... 9 
The Fraud Triangle at Work ? ............................................................................................ 12 
Using AML Legislation To Address Corruption .................................................................. 14 
Method 1: Significant Cash Transaction Reports ................................................................. 18 
Method 2: Guideline on Government Cheque Due Diligence ............................................... 21 
Conclusion: Lessons Learned - Merging Forensic Accounting Practice with Teaching and 













This paper details some of the innovative methods that the Papua New Guinea Financial 
Intelligence Unit has developed using anti-money laundering legislation to address 
large-scale grand corruption.  
In an environment where many Government systems are affected by corruption, these 
methods have had a measure of success where other changes attempted have had a more 
limited impact.  
It is likely that the problems experienced by Papua New Guinea are also seen in other 
developing countries and, as such, these processes are presented here in the hope that 
they may be of interest to other countries battling corruption. Equally, they are 
hopefully of interest to those working in the field of forensic accounting research and 
teaching, as it is in this context that Forensic Accounting may potentially be able to 
make a direct and real contribution toward the alleviation of poverty and suffering in 
developing countries.   
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International Deployment Group, John was advisor to the Papua New Guinea Financial 
Intelligence Unit (PNGFIU) from May 2009 to August 2011. 
Detective Senior Sergeant Bernard Barrum is the Officer-In-Charge (OIC) of the 
PNGFIU. Bernard has over 30 years experience in the Royal Papua New Guinea 
Constabulary, 21 of those years specialising in fraud and corruption investigation. 
Bernard has been the OIC of PNGFIU since its inception in 2007. 
 
PNG – A Brief History and Description 
 
Papua New Guinea (PNG) is an independent1 country of approximately 6.8 million 
people (World Bank, 2009), occupying the Eastern half of the island of New Guinea.  
PNG is richly endowed with natural resources but has an under-developed economy 
leaving it ranked 137 out of 169 countries in the 2010 United Nations Development 
Programme, Human Development Index (UNDP, 2010)  the second lowest in the Asia-
Pacific Region. In 1996, the latest date for available information, 57.4% of the PNG 
population were estimated to be living on less than US$2 a day (World Bank, 1996) 
with about 87 % living in rural areas in an agricultural subsistence lifestyle.(CIA World 
Factbook) 
 In 2008 only 33 % of the rural population were estimated to have access to an adequate 
water supply (World Bank, 2008) and over half of the population did not have access to 
adequate sanitation. (World Bank, 2008)  
                                                          
1
 PNG achieved independence in 1975, having been variously under French, German, UK and Australian 
since 1885 
 




Politics in Papua New Guinea are highly competitive but fractured down ethnic lines 
with many members of parliament elected on a personal or ethnic basis rather than as a 
result of ideological or party affiliation. There are several political parties, however 
party allegiances are unreliable, and winning candidates are often courted (and it is 
alleged, bribed) in efforts to forge the majority needed to form a Government.   
It has been observed by Transparency International that a significant number of 
politicians (or potential politicians) view political life in terms of the opportunity for 
self enrichment. „Contesting elections has become a god-sent opportunity to wealth 
creation…most medium scale business activities in PNG are owned by politicians and 
ex-politicians” (Transparency International, 2003)     
Allegations exist of vote buying and of public servants funding election campaigns 




The PNG Government Budget for 2011 was approximately K9.328 billion (O‟Neill, 
2010) (AUD 3.886 billion) of which K7.331 billion (AUD3.054 billion) is sourced from 
taxation revenue with the balance coming from resources. In 2009 Gross Domestic 
Product was estimated at US$7.89 billion (K18 billion) (World Bank, World 
Development Indicators, 2009 ) and a GDP per capita estimated at US$1,172 for the 
same year.  
In 2011-12 it is estimated that Papua New Guinea will receive AUD482.3 million in 
Official Development Assistance from Australia (Ausaid) (Ausaid, 2011) which 
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represents approximately 6% of GDP. 
Corruption 
 
Corruption in Papua New Guinea is generally perceived to be systemic and systematic. 
There is barely a day goes by when the print media, radio and television news don‟t 
mention corruption as a topic. The 2010 Transparency International Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) ranked Papua New Guinea at 154 out of 178 (Transparency 
International, 2010) surveyed countries, with a score of 2.1.
2
 this ranks Papua New 
Guinea equal with countries such as Kenya, Congo, Russia, Laos and Cambodia and 
below countries such as Indonesia, India, Colombia and Mexico. 
 
Perhaps the most definitive indication of the scale of corruption in PNG comes from the 
Papua New Guinea Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee (PPAC) Inquiry. The 
PPAC is (at the time of writing) conducting inquiries into the public accounts from the 
years 2004 onwards. The Inquiry‟s latest available report, released in 20093, covers the 
Public Accounts for 2006. In this report the PPAC states:  
  
 (The) collapse of accountability and responsible, lawful and competent fiscal 
management was, and remains, a direct threat to the viability and civil stability 
of the Nation and the health and welfare of our citizens; (p1) 
   There (is) a culture of impunity (where)  fiscal mishandling and 
misappropriation has prospered .... There  is, no fear or risk of detection or 
                                                          
2 CPI score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people and country analysts, and 
ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). 
3
 The PPAC is known to have released a report in 2011 into the accounts for 2007 but this report is not yet available 
on the Parliamentary website. 
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punishment for those who would act illegally with public funds; ( p2) 
   The Department of Finance, (has) arrogated to itself sovereign power over the 
use and application of public monies, often in open defiance of Government 
appropriation, policy and directive. .... and  intentionally refused to render 
account or assistance to this Parliament. ( p4) 
 The failure of service and development delivery will, and has already, resulted 
in significant social unrest. In other words, the loss of Parliamentary power and 
fiscal control, and thereby policy implementation, has created an increasingly 
angry, impoverished and disillusioned citizenry, deprived of the services that 
they have the right to receive ( p5) 
 (There) is no detectable will or ability in the Public Service – particularly in the 
Department of Finance – to change or reform. The huge amounts of money 
misappropriated in that Department clearly displace any ability or wish to 
change or to comply with the duties imposed on that Department; ( p6) 
   Illegal and/or and improper practices (are) rife - particularly in the very 
Department responsible for fiscal management, the Department of Finance, but 
also across the entire spectrum of Government at every level – National, 
Provincial and Local. .... Governments and law enforcement agencies failed to 
grapple with the problem and this failure emboldened the misusers, who moved 
in a few years from small scale opportunistic misappropriation to the organized 
diversion of huge sums of public money – with apparent immunity and impunity. 
( p11) 
   misappropriation, theft, misapplication, fraud and illegal and improper handling 
of public monies (have) become an incident of Governance in Papua New 
Guinea;  (p157) 
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 This Committee has made many referrals in the past four years with no action 
taken by any law enforcement agency and if we were to refer accountable Public 
Servants for failure to perform their duty or fiscal mismanagement, there would 
scarcely be an officer who would remain. .... The Royal Papua New Guinea 
Constabulary seems incapable or unwilling or both of investigating or 
prosecuting complex fiscal crime .... The very culture of impunity that we have 
identified in this Report means that any referral by us would be a hollow gesture 
– and it is high time that the National Parliament realized the extent and terrible 
effect that this collapse of law enforcement has had on our National Institutions  
( p173)  
The PPAC report into the 2006 accounts is 178 pages and ends with the following; 
The National Parliament must address this National state of failure immediately. 
The future, viability and reputation of the Government of Papua New Guinea 
and the welfare of its citizens demand it. 
 
The claim that malfeasance there is “a direct threat to the viability and civil stability of 
the Nation and the health and welfare of its citizens”  appears to indicate that the losses 
observed are significant. Estimations of quite how significant those losses are range 
from about 10% of the Government budget in 2002 (Holden et al, 2003)  to 50% of the 
Government budget in 2010  (Radio New Zealand, 17 Feb 2011) (The National 17 Feb 
2011) (Post Courier 16 Feb 2011) equivalent to about 20% of GDP.  
 
Further indications of the quantum of fraud and corruption are provided by such reports 
as the 14 July, 2011 announcement by the RPNGC that it was commencing an 
investigation into the alleged misapplication of K1.9 billion (AUD 700 million) of the 
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development budget (equivalent to 20% of the total Government budget) by the former 
secretary of National Planning paid out over three months to June 2011. (The National, 
July 14, 2011) 
 
Background on the Papua New Guinea Financial Intelligence Unit  
 
The authors‟ recent involvement in combating corruption in PNG arose out of their 
placement in the PNG Financial Intelligence Unit (PNGFIU). One, as the Officer-In-
Charge, and the other, as an Adviser to the PNGFIU under the Papua New Guinea-
Australia Policing Partnership. 
The PNGFIU was created within the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary, PNG‟s 
National Police Force, by Section 13 of the Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) 2005. It has 
an approved organisational strength of 6 members but actual strength had not exceeded 
4 members in the two years to July 2011. It was established on 16 July 2007 and 
commenced operations in November 2007 with its functions detailed in the POCA 
which positions the PNGFIU as the AML/CTF regulator and supervisor. Among its 
functions are the requirement to train Cash Dealers, conduct investigations, issue 
guidelines, compile statistics, make recommendations, advise the Minister and receive 
and analyse  financial intelligence.  
The legislation which created the PNGFIU, was introduced in 2005 as part of a package 
of 3 Acts to give effect to PNG‟s obligations under certain declarations
4
 by the South 
Pacific Forum (SPF) on law enforcement cooperation to combat transnational crime.  It 
                                                          
4
 Declaration by the South Pacific Forum on Law Enforcement Cooperation ( the Honiara declaration) 1992, & the 
Nasonini Declaration on Regional Security adopting the FATF 40 recommendations.  
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was not enacted to combat domestic corruption or prevent other domestic financially 
motivated crime but was part of a broader promulgation of FATF recommendations in 
many countries around the world –recommendations that were originally drawn up in 
1990 „as an initiative to combat the misuse of financial systems by persons laundering 
drug money‟ (FATF, 2003) and are only relatively recently being viewed (and 
reviewed) in light of their potential use in the fight against corruption.5 
The drafting of Papua New Guinea‟s POCA was based upon a generic proceeds of 
crime Act6  (somewhat) tailored to PNG conditions, such as they were then understood, 
by the Papua New Guinea Director of Public Prosecutions, with the assistance of a 
deputy commissioner of the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary
7
.  
If the PNG POCA has limitations they perhaps arise from its inception as a tool to 
prevent PNG financial systems from being used to launder drug money from other 
countries. 8Issues such as focus on “cash transactions” and “Cash Dealers” for example, 
ignores the fact that much of the grand corruption in PNG is conducted using  
government cheques. Similarly suspicious transaction reporting under the PNG POCA 
requires Cash Dealers who have reasonable grounds to suspect that information that 
they hold may be; 
                                                          
5
 In 2010 FATF produced a reference guide to on the use of the FATF Recommendations to support the fight against 
Corruption in response to a request by  G20 leaders to the FATF to help detect and deter the proceeds of corruption 
by strengthening the FATF Recommendations 
6
 Produced for the Pacific Islands Legal Officers Network with assistance from the Australian Attorney-General‟s 
Criminal Justice Division, and the Office of Legislative Drafting and Publishing. 
7
 Information provided to PNGFIU by PNG Department of Justice 31 May 2011 
8
  the same observation perhaps could be made of the FATF Recommendations themselves. 
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„relevant to the investigation or prosecution of a person for a serious offence, it 
must take measures to find out: the purpose of the transaction; the origin of the 
funds; and where the funds will be sent‟  
This appears to assume that the money is merely transiting the customer‟s account and 
furthermore may be read to suggest a level of implied passivity on the part of the Cash 
Dealer in with respect to their identification of such suspicious transactions. 
Additionally, the Section may be read to suggest that the Cash Dealer need not ensure 
that the source and application of the funds is consistent with their knowledge of the 
customer.  
Also, the Act‟s focus on “proceeds of crime” potentially hinders the prevention of 
corruption where the criminality presents during the disbursement of the funds as 
opposed to being apparent at during its placement into the financial system. Such a 
situation might exist where, for example, a deposit is made of a large Government 
cheque for an infrastructure project into a company account followed by large 
disbursements into accounts controlled by public servants employed by the department 
issuing the cheque or large cash withdrawals made in locations geographically distant 
from the stated location of the project.   
These issues with the legislation could clearly be addressed through amendment.  
Ongoing political issues however have resulted in the Parliament of Papua New Guinea 
sitting for less than 60 days in the period from December 2009 to July 2011. Little in 
the way of legislation of any type was passed during this time and unfortunately, 
examples of legislation proposed over the last 2 years would tend to indicate a 
legislature interested in curtailing the effectiveness of oversight bodies such as the 
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Ombudsman Commission (and by implication, probably the PNGFIU) rather than 
enhancing anti-corruption processes.   
The Fraud Triangle at Work ? 
 
Exactly why Papua New Guinea is suffering such high levels of corruption is difficult to 
explain. The proximate cause for the losses to fraud and corruption are perhaps best 
described by the former Treasury and Finance Minister, now Prime Minister Peter 
O‟Neill, when in May 2011 he was quoted as speaking of “the systematic breakdown in 
the public service” (Kolma, 2011). The ultimate cause however may be far more 
complex and possibly due to cultural and historical influences upon which Donald R. 
Cressey‟s „Fraud Triangle‟ potentially sheds some light. 
The average wage for a public servant in PNG, including police officers, is 
approximately K23,000 per annum with many private sector employees such as bank 
employees earning not much more. This disparity between the cost of living and 
salaries, coupled with family or „wantok‟ obligations, appears to place many public 
servants in a situation where the temptation to engage in corrupt behavior to supplement 
income is likely to far outweigh any individual considerations of integrity.   
 
The Fraud Triangle suggests there are three factors likely to be present in every situation 
of fraud: 
 
 Motive (or pressure) – the need for committing fraud (need for money, etc.); 
 Rationalization – the mindset of the fraudster that justifies them to commit 
fraud;  and 
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 Opportunity – the situation that enables fraud to occur (often when internal 
controls are weak or non-existent). 
Wolfe and Hermanson (2004) add to the triangle a fourth element, that being 
„Capability‟ – the necessary traits and abilities to commit the fraud. 
 
An examination of the circumstances of many Papua New Guinean public servants 
shows that many of them are in situations where at least the first three factors are 
present - Low relative wages and family pressures providing the motive for fraud. A 
rationalisation that „everyone else is doing it‟ or „if I don‟t take it someone else will‟, 
and lax governance, poor oversight and a less than diligent banking sector providing 
ample opportunity.   
The lens of the fraud triangle/diamond undoubtedly provides useful insights into 
individual instances of fraud which is certainly useful when applied on an 
organizational level to prevent fraud. The application of such insights, on a macro or 
country level, to provide effective methods of countering widespread corruption 
however appear less certain.  
 
In formulating methods for the PNGFIU to counter corruption the authors‟ observed 
that there was little that they could achieve in the terms altering the environment to 
reduce motive, or capability. Reducing „motive‟ would most likely require an increase 
in public service salary, a reduction in the cost of living and alteration of cultural norms 
to reduce „wantok‟ obligations – all unfortunately outside the capacity of the authors. 
 Reducing „capability‟ as regards and individuals‟ personal abilities would appear to be 
an impossibility and/or counter- productive, as those capable of engaging in corruption 
are also likely to be the most capable workers.  
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The theoretical basis for the actions taken by the authors over the past two years have, 
as a consequence, focused on altering the „rationalisation‟ of fraud by reducing the 
perception that corruption is going unnoticed and increasing the deterrent through 
increasing the perceived risk of being detected. With this went a focus on reducing 
„opportunity‟ through a restriction of the avenues to place the proceeds into the banking 
system.  „Opportunity‟ certainly presents itself regularly to public servants in terms of 
poor legislative control, lax governance and poor management oversight.  There is little 
on this side of the equation, however, that offered an apparent, viable solution in the 
short term. 
Using AML Legislation to Address Corruption  
 
The solutions developed in the PNGFIU using the AML legislation provided in the 
POCA.  They were „flag shipped‟ by two processes; one to raise the perceived risk of 
being detected or caught, and another other to reduce opportunity to place funds into the 
banking system. They were a departure from traditional methods of dealing with 
corruption in PNG which would typically be based upon deterrence through 
investigating and prosecuting offenders. The methods themselves are described below, 
but it is perhaps worth noting a couple of points about the POCA and the PNG 
environment prior to discussing them. 
The POCA‟s stated purpose is to provide measures against “money laundering”, and to 
„deprive persons of the proceeds of, and benefits derived from, the commission of 
offences‟ (Proceeds of Crime Act 2005 Preamble)  
The impetus for criminals to launder money, that is, hide or obfuscate the illegitimate 
source of funds however, only occurs when the offender perceives a reasonable risk of 
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being caught and/or suffering some sort of punishment. The observations in the PPAC 
(2009) that The Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary „seem incapable or unwilling 
or both of investigating or prosecuting complex fiscal crime‟  hints at an environment 
where offenders most likely perceive little risk of being caught and therefore little need 
to „launder‟ their funds.   
It may come as little surprise then to know that the greatest challenge facing the 
PNGFIU has not been in detecting the offences and/or offenders but in determining an 
effective strategy to disrupt the very large numbers of identified offenders and prevent 
repetition of their offences. The PNGFIU believes that it would be unlikely to have any 
measurable effect by using the process of criminal prosecution - The number of 
offenders is too large, the resources of the PNGFIU too few and the court system too 
slow. It is also apparent that investigation of offences committed by Government 
employees is very often hampered by the inability to obtain even basic documentation 
regarding the offending transactions and events.  
A potential alternative to criminal prosecution is the process of restraint and forfeiture 
of proceeds of crime. This process is sometimes viewed internationally as one of the 
more effective methods of preventing money laundering and its predicate offences such 
as corruption
9
, particularly so, when it concerns a country that has a „non-conviction‟ 
based forfeiture regime, such as that found in Papua New Guinea. The view that 
restraint of proceeds of crime is a potentially effective method of deterring corruption is 
possibly based upon the assumption that restraint of proceeds of crime can and will 
achieve a deterrent effect. For this to occur however, a „critical mass‟ of cases would 
probably need to be progressed through the court system to provide criminals (or 
                                                          
9
 Chapter V of the UN Convention Against Corruption states „The return of assets pursuant to this chapter 
is a fundamental principle of this Convention‟. 
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would-be criminals) with sufficient cause for concern that they would modify their 
behaviour. This critical mass of cases would likely require motivated and adequately 
resourced authorities from the police through to the courts, as well as access to 
sufficient information, intelligence and evidence to identify and support cases. All of 
this, assumes a functioning public service.  
 
PNG has (at the time of writing) seen four „restraint of proceeds‟ actions under the 
POCA since commencing such actions in December 2009. These have generated little 
in the way of media coverage or apparent deterrent effect
10
. Furthermore, restraining 
proceeds of crime in an environment like PNG can place the people conducting the 
investigations at risk of personal injury. 
 
After much consideration of alternatives, the PNGFIU assessed that the most practicable 
method of addressing corruption and fraud might be to address the largest (though 
perhaps unwitting) facilitators or „gatekeepers‟ of corruption and fraud – the 
commercial banks. 
 
PNG has only four commercial banks. The largest of these holds most of the personal 
accounts of Government employees and many of the Government trust accounts, which 
are a regular victim of fraud. 
                                                          
10
 The company that forfeited the PGK1.3 million by consent received a further PGK 2 million 
Government payment only a few months later. 
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In support of this method, is the work of the International Centre for Asset Recovery 
(ICAR)
11
. The ICAR Practitioner‟s Handbook on Tracing Stolen Assets suggests that, in 
relation to the use of the criminal offence of money laundering, with regard to financial 
institutions;   
 
„If they know, or if they must assume that the assets entrusted to them are the 
proceeds of a (serious) crime and do not refrain from accepting or transferring 
them they will be held criminally liable .... Reminding them of their possible 
criminal liability for money laundering can be a powerful tool….‟ (ICAR,2009) 
 
This advice is offered by ICAR was in relation to encouraging cooperation in asset 
tracing investigations, the PNGFIU used this concept in a rather more direct fashion by 
relying on sections 34 and 35 of the POCA.  
In December 2009, the PNGFIU sought advice from the Department of Justice and 
Attorney General on whether a Cash Dealer that receives a suspicious Government 
cheque could be prosecuted under S35 of the POCA. Specifically, whether a bank that 
receives a cheque, „receives‟, „possesses‟ or „disposes of‟ the funds. The response was 
in the affirmative, and the advice went on to say that the FIU could consider issuing a 
guideline detailing when the FIU would be likely to seek prosecution ie.  when it would 
be reasonable to suspect (that money is the proceeds of crime).
12
 - Advice that the 
PNGFIU made use of in formulating a guideline which is the basis of „Method 2‟, 
discussed below. 
                                                          
11
 Part of the Basel Institute on Governance 
12
 Email from PNG Department of Justice and Attorney-General to PNGFIU 4 December 2009 
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Method 1: Significant Cash Transaction Reports  
 
The first method of addressing corruption was to use Cash Transaction Reports to 
identify public servants conducting transactions indicative of corruption and raise the 
perceived risk of being identified and detected. Specifically to identify public servants 
who were repeatedly making large deposits well in excess of their legitimate earnings 
and inform them that their transactions had been observed. 
 
The PNGFIU convened a series of meetings with the commercial banks under the 
banner of an “AML Working Group”,13,14. This Working Group provided the platform 
for commencement of receipt of cash transaction and international funds transfer reports 
The reports were then analysed to identify people who had their addresses recorded as  
„C/-„ a Government department. This analysis provided a significant number of 
Government employees who were repeatedly depositing amounts well in excess of their 
yearly salary directly into their own accounts with no attempt to hide the transactions.  
Additionally, some of the people identified through this process had come to notice 
previously for their involvement in non-legitimate disbursements from Government 
accounts which had been the subject of successful restraint action by the PNGFIU. 
 
Having identified these transactions the PNGFIU needed a method of definitively 
differentiating legitimate from illegitimate transactions and, more importantly, a method 
                                                          
13
 so named to engender a sense of shared responsibility amongst the banks for preventing money 
laundering – an attempt that was reasonably successful 
14
 The AML Working Group provided the direction for a number of initiatives the PNGFIU put into 
practice over the next two years. These included electronic reporting of STRs; sharing of STRs with all of 
the banks to reduce „bank shopping‟ by offenders; working with the Central Bank on enhanced due 
diligence; provision of a Fraud Methodology Report; and the Guideline on Government Cheques and 
Payments 
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of raising the perception that these transactions were being observed and to continue 
them might be a risky prospect.  
 
With offenders spread across the country, and insufficient resources to travel, the 
PNGFIU decided to request that the banks question their customers. The PNGFIU sent 
the list of names to the relevant bank and provided the impetus for the banks to 
undertake questioning of their customers by advising the bank that the PNGFIU 
suspected the transactions to involve the proceeds of crime –thereby triggering the 
potential for prosecution of the bank under S35 of the POCA
15
  if the bank facilitated 
similar transactions by the same customers without first ensuring that the transactions 
are legitimate.  
The banks were requested to interview the customers to assure themselves (and the FIU) 
that the funds were legitimate. After some further negotiation, the most affected bank 
placed a number of the identified accounts on alert, questioned a number of account 
holders and commenced reporting STRs on the identified persons.  
 
The banks first questioned their customers in early May 2010, around this same time a 
number of newspaper and television advertisements on the Proceeds of Crime Act were 
run in the three national newspapers. A number of people identified and questioned 
about their transactions by the banks modified their transaction behaviour immediately, 
with some ceasing the suspicious transaction activity entirely.  
 
                                                          
15
  Section 35 states “A person who receives, possesses, conceals, disposes of or brings into Papua New 
Guinea money, or other property, that may reasonably be suspected of being proceeds of crime is guilty 
of an offence”. 
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The newspaper advertisements that ran were placed by the PNGFIU and funded by the 
Department of Justice. The advertisements explained the reasons why the banks were 
querying customers on their transactions and had the dual effect of modifying the 
behaviour of bank staff and customers – encouraging bank staff to be active in 
identifying and rejecting suspicious transactions and providing them with a basis upon 
which to do it.  Attachment 1 is a copy of one of these advertisements and 2 the same 
advertisement in Tok Pisin. One of the banks later turned this advertisement into posters 
displayed in their branches.  
 
Unfortunately the bank didn‟t close or suspend any accounts at this first stage and it 
rejected only a few transactions. Some of the Government employees conducting these 
transactions continued for many more months and some of those who stopped initially, 
later re-commenced and were again the topic of discussion between the PNGFIU and 
the bank. On 3 June 2011, senior management of the most affected bank agreed to 
commence a process of suspending and closing offender‟s accounts and on 23 June put 
in place a process to prevent cashing of Government cheques over a certain threshold by 
Government employees or their representatives.  
 
At the time of writing the PNGFIU is still providing list of Government employees to 
the banks, however, the names seen in the early stages no longer appear and the 
amounts being deposited are significantly smaller. The amount of corruption disrupted 
through this process is difficult to determine as offenders may have merely changed 
their methodology but is estimated to be in the vicinity of K20 million to date. 
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Method 2: Guideline on Government Cheque Due Diligence  
 
Despite the large and frequent transactions conducted by Government employees being 
a problem, that issue pales in comparison to the issue of fraud and corruption 
conducting using Government issued cheques.  
As the APG and World Bank noted during the AML/CTF mutual evaluation process; 
“Laundering the proceeds of large scale public sector corruption in PNG 
consistently indicate direct placement in the banking sector” (APG/World Bank, 
2011, P103) 
 
From meetings with banks in the AML Working Group the banks made it clear that, 
while they may have been processing Government cheques that had been obtained 
through illegal means, they did not have the staff, skills nor systems to allow them to do 
otherwise. They were not able to effectively differentiate between the legitimate and 
illegitimate cheques and were not in a position to vet every transaction involving a 
Government cheque. (One bank suggested on more than one occasion that perhaps they 
could report every Government cheque as a Suspicious Transaction and let the PNGFIU 
sort them out) 
 
The PNGFIU is vested with both the requirement to enforce the Proceeds of Crime Act 
as well as train banks and other Cash Dealers,  however it is somewhat hampered by an 
inability to impose any form of effective sanction on a Cash Dealer other than criminal 
prosecution.  
 
The PNGFIU is mindful that prosecution for a money laundering offence is a very blunt 
tool and could place a bank‟s correspondent banking relationships in jeopardy, possibly 
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leading to the collapse of the bank.16  Under these circumstances prosecuting a bank for 
money laundering did not present a feasible solution without first attempting to modify 
banking processes through other less confrontational means.  
Wearing the twin hats of regulator and trainer the PNGFIU offered to prepare a 
guideline outlining some basic methods for identifying illegitimate transactions and 
conducting due diligence on Government cheques. The guideline outlined the minimum 
processes that a bank would have to undertake to be able to show that it was acting in 
good faith in attempting to ensure the cheques they processed were legal.  The intention 
of the PNGFIU in issuing the Guideline was to encourage the banks to cease facilitation 
of fraudulent transactions without having to prosecute them.  
Drafting of the guideline started in late 2009, went through 8 drafts, was discussed at 
numerous meetings and was the subject of considerable correspondence and debate.  
Attachment 3 is a copy of the „Guideline on „Due Diligence In Relation To Government 
Cheques and Payments‟ issued by the PNGFIU on 2 June 2011. It applies to 
Government cheques and payments with a value of more than K2 million (AUD 
800,000). 
The banks did not accept the guideline without negotiation – understandably so, as the 
Guideline enunciates the increased burden the banks were now being placed under in 
order to avoid committing offences under the POCA.  
                                                          
16
 FATF Recommendation 7 states “Financial institutions should, in relation to cross-border 
correspondent banking and other similar relationships, in addition to performing normal due diligence 
measures: a) Gather sufficient information about a respondent institution to understand fully the nature of 
the respondent‟s business and to determine from publicly available information the reputation of the 
institution and the quality of supervision, including whether it has been subject to a money laundering or 
terrorist financing investigation or regulatory action. b) Assess the respondent institution‟s anti-money 
laundering and terrorist financing controls. 
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After reading the first draft the banks expressed some concern about the volume of 
documentation to be retained and subsequently an amendment was made to reduce this 
burden. The banks also expressed concern that they were „becoming policemen‟.17. 
Later, one of the banks responded that while it had „no reservations in adopting the 
guideline‟ however they expressed the opinion that the POCA „does not impose any 
obligation for compliance of these guidelines by cash dealers‟. Furthermore,  „the only 
obligation under the POCA is for cash dealers to report suspect transactions to the 
PNGFIU‟ and „it is the PNGFIU and the police generally who are empowered to take 





 highlighted to the bank in question that the PNGFIU did 
indeed intend to take action on the proceeds of crime, though perhaps not by the 
traditional methods envisaged by the bank when drafting their response.  
The PNGFIU response included advice that the PNGFIU considered that a bank not 
only had the right but the obligation to seek any and all information and documentation 
sufficient to ensure itself that the funds it receives are not sourced from the proceeds of 
crime. 
The response also indicated that the requirement imposed by the POCA on the Cash 
Dealers to know a customer‟s business, identify the ultimate beneficiary, and to train 
staff to recognise money laundering transactions placed Cash Dealers in a position 
                                                          
17
 The PNGFIU were advised in late 2010 in a meeting with an IMF consultant that banks expressing an 
opinion that they are doing the work of the police is not uncommon in jurisdictions with newly introduced 
or enforced AML legislation. 
18
 Letter to OIC PNGFIU dated 4 March 2011 
19
 Letter from OIC PNGFIU dated 17 May 2011 
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where they are required to actively indentify transactions relating to proceeds of crime 
not merely report suspicious transactions that may become aware of.   
The issuing of the Guideline had an immediate impact. On 23 June 2011 senior 
management of the most affected bank issued a notice to its branches that no cash 
transactions relating to Government payments would be paid to Government employees 
or representatives. On 30 June the same bank placed an advertisement in the newspapers 
advising that „special clearance‟ on cheques would no longer be allowed and that all 
cheques would have to clear in the normal timeframe20. (The National Newspaper, 30 
June 2011, page 10) („special clearance‟ having been identified as a „red flag‟ in the 
guideline). 
The issuing of the Guideline triggered a response in the media commencing with an 
article titled  “Banks Join Fraud War”21. The article observed , 
„Commercial banks and financial institutions are being corralled in to assist in 
the fight against fraud and corruption in government‟. (Kolma, July 19, 2011)  
A later article stated that the Guideline was:  
 “actually aimed at abrogating the responsibility and liability of the government 
in terms of ensuring good governance” (Kolma, 29 July 2011, The National 
Newspaper)    
A later radio interview included the opinion that:  
                                                          
20
 The advertisement stated that „this change is to assist us in protecting your interests‟ 
21
  19 July, The National Newspaper  
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“it's not the role of the banks to ensure there is transparency and accountability with 
government expenditure”(Radio Australia, 1 August 2011) 
Further media articles questioned whether the guideline sought to:  
“abrogate the governance responsibility of government and the duties of the Financial 
Intelligence Unit (FIU) to investigate money laundering into the financial system” 
 (Kolma, 5 August 2011) 
The legitimate point of contention alluded to in these reports relates to the level of 
responsibility that banks might be required to bear to ensure that the transactions they 
process are not facilitating crime. 
It is arguable that in an environment where corruption is not systemic this responsibility 
is low. However, in an environment like PNG where „huge sums of public money‟ are 
misappropriated by all levels of Government, the responsibility of a bank to ensure it 
isn‟t facilitating corruption perhaps should be a little higher.  
Furthermore, the consequence of not acting to prevent transactions in each of the 
circumstances is very different. A bank in a developed country like Australia that fails 
to prevent the placement of drug proceeds into the banking system is less likely to 
impact on the „viability and stability of the nation and health and welfare of its citizens‟.  
For a bank that facilitates (or is used to facilitate) grand corruption in a country like 
PNG, that risk is considerably higher, particularly where such transactions are repeated 
week after week, year after year. As such banks in such environments should arguably 
be held to a higher standard of accountability. 
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Ultimately, however the question of the level of responsibility of banks for the 
transactions that they engage in may have to be resolved, in Papua New Guinea at least, 
by the courts. The Guideline provides a direction to the banks, as the Department of 
Justice put it, as to „when the FIU would be likely to seek prosecution‟ and when it is 
reasonable to suspect that the funds they handle are the proceeds of crime. It also, as the 
APG and World Bank noted;  
„reflects the priority on combating the proceeds of corruption through the banking 
sector and while it does not create new obligations, it does provide guidance on 
high risk scenarios and makes explicit a number of implicit primary obligations 
contained in POCA. The draft Guideline provides further in-depth guidance on 
practical implementation of the CDD obligations included in the POCA in the 
context of accepting government cheques and payments, including „red flags‟. 
(APG/World Bank, 2011, p102) 
It is therefore not unreasonable to expect that the courts may refer to the Guideline in 
deciding whether a particular transaction was money laundering.   
It is acknowledged that Cash Dealers in PNG (as in many countries) are placed the 
difficult position of appropriately responding to transactions that they suspect to be the 
source or application of proceeds of crime. Legislation requires them to identify such 
transactions but simultaneously makes handling such funds illegal. 
At the time of writing the PNGFIU had not yet commenced process to prosecute any of 
the banks under the POCA. That option always remains an open but will no doubt be a 
last resort dependent due to the potential catastrophic effect such action could have 
upon the bank. 
 
Page | 27  
 
The most affected bank and the PNG central bank (the Bank of Papua New Guinea) 
responded to the Guideline by commencing a process to implement elements of the 
Guideline which at the time of writing had lead to the identification and disruption of 
several tens of millions in illegitimate payments.  No attempt has been made to quantify 
the ongoing deterrent effect of such disruption however it is believed to be significant. 
Conclusion: Lessons Learned - Merging Forensic Accounting 
Practice with Teaching and Research 
 
The PNGFIU is attempting to break the cycle of systemic corruption in Papua New 
Guinea in an environment pervaded by a „collapsed public service‟ using innovative 
processes developed from anti money laundering legislation that don‟t rely on the 
criminal justice system or cooperation from the agencies of the public service; or 
require significant funding.  The skills and knowledge to do this have covered the 
forensic accounting spectrum, from technical investigative skills, data manipulation and 
analysis, legislative interpretation, legal analysis, and negotiation. 
The legislation available to the PNGFIU suffers from having been drafted based upon 
laws intended to prevent laundering of the proceeds of international drug crime.  That 
has not prevented the PNGFIU using it with good effect and hopefully providing the 
catalyst for a longer-term reduction in corruption. 
PNG shares problems such as lax governance and high levels of fraud and corruption 
with other developing countries. As such, the processes developed by the PNGFIU may 
be transferable to them with some modification. In this context, the assistance that 
forensic accounting research and teaching might offer has the potential to significant. 
To be really useful, solutions developed to address corruption need to be context-
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specific and embody an appreciation of the difficulties that face practitioners operating 
in the environment. 
There is no doubt that the authors of this report have benefited from skills learned in 
formal training, including studies in accounting, financial investigation and forensic 
accounting.  Obtaining this sort of training, however, has its challenges. There is a 
scarcity of research and courses available that deal with the investigation or disruption 
of corruption in developing countries using AML methodology.   
Research conducted by groups such as the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering 
and FATF is, quite rightly, focussed on laundering typologies and prevention of 
corruption through application of the FATF Recommendations. At the other end of the 
spectrum, groups such as Transparency International focus on methods of deterring 
corruption by exposing corrupt practices and informing civil society. Between these two 
styles of corruption fighting there may be a niche for forensic accounting to fill by 
providing methods of deterring corruption through means similar to those developed by 
the PNGFIU.   
It is acknowledged that the processes currently being used in Papua New Guinea to 
begin to address corruption will need to be constantly modified as criminal behaviour 
changes. Successful modification will require a detailed knowledge of current criminal 
behaviour, the application of relevant legislation and, more problematically, 
identification and implementation of effective methods of disruption.   
Some of the training that is available on AML methodology is based on the assumption, 
for example, that offenders will have used complex methods of laundering as found in 
developed countries. Less often is training provided that gives practitioners skills to 
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generate strategies and methods of preventing, disrupting or reducing large-scale grand 
corruption as found in Papua New Guinea.  Research into forensic accounting in the 
developing country context has the potential to produce the types of valuable insights 
required to assist future practitioners to develop these skills. Improvements in forensic 
accounting practice through the teaching and sharing of these insights may have the 
potential to contribute significantly to the fight against corruption and a reduction in 
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